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deter[s83,jmc]		The ethics of deterrence

for Free Inquiry, Box 5, Central Park Station, Buffalo, New York 14215-0005
(716)834-2921
editor = Paul Kurtz

	THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

	The ethics of deterrence are clear; the disagreement is
about the facts.

	The ethical and practical case for nuclear deterrence involves
the following contentions:

	1. If the United States fails to deter the Soviet Union
by maintaining sufficient nuclear military power, there is a substantial
probability that the Soviet Union will be tempted to use military
power to impose their rule on much more of the world, including possibly
the U.S. itself.

	2. This would be very bad for the U.S. and anyone else who
fell under Soviet rule.

	3. If we maintain a suitable nuclear deterrent, there is a good
chance we will escape Soviet rule.

	4. Indeed there is a good chance we will avoid nuclear war.

	The case for nuclear deterrence depends on the nature of the
Soviet Union.  We feel no need for a nuclear deterrent against Canada
and they feel no need for a nuclear deterrent against us.
However, any estimate of the likely behavior of the Soviet rulers is
uncertain.  When Churchill called the Soviet union a riddle wrapped
in an enigma, he wasn't kidding.

	Therefore, we begin with an estimate of the Soviet Union,
and an estimate of the uncertainty of this estimate.

	The political character of the Soviet Union is the result
of an interaction between communist ideology and the increasingly
oligarchic society that has developed since the revolution.

	Establishing a level of trust that would make it possible to
rely on the Soviets not to cheat is not promising.  The suspicion
of the outside world is one of the foundations of the ideology and
one of the foundations of the claim for the legitimacy of the rule.
No non-communist American ever gets credit for good will; an action
of which the Soviet Government approves is praised as "realistic",
as recognizing the futility of the previous policy.

	We need to pay for the abolition of the secrecy.

	Bargain for the elimination of the Soviet draft.

	Since the Soviet Union is rather unpredictable, we
should maintain offers but not create conditions where we
hold ourselves responsible for lack of progress in negotiations.

	Every time the ruler is replaced, there is some chance
that the new ruler will have ideas that he never dared admit before.
The Eisenhower Administration may have missed an opportunity
with Kruschev by adopting a wait-and-see policy and by maintaining
the U-2 flights.  On the other hand there may not have been
such an opportunity.

	There was no apparent opportunity when Brezhnev took over,
and all the evidence is that Andropov will be harder to get along
with than Brezhnev.  The evidence is that Andropov is emphasizing
the methods of the KGB with which he is familiar in both internal
and foreign politics.

	Whatever policy we adopt must be one we can sustain for
the forseeable future.

How bad is a nuclear war?

	It would be very bad, but there are upper limits.
Putting any upper limit on how bad a nuclear war is subjects
one to a dishonest attack.  One is accused of not opposing
or even favoring nuclear war if one resists the worst scenarios.

	A nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
would be very bad indeed.  The initial effects would kill
a large fraction of the population of both countries, and
it probably wouldn't stop.

	I can think of no circumstances that would justify the
United States attacking the Soviet Union.  I cannot imagine
our ever being so certain that they were going to attack us
that preemption would be justified.

	Therefore, I think the war we fear must be a Soviet
attack on the U.S.

	The simplest scenario is the long term plot.  Many have
imagined that the Politbureau has made a plan to acquire military
superiority and that when this superiority reaches an appropriate
point they will attack.  This is conceivable but unlikely.  You
have to believe that Brezhnev was working toward this goal during
his entire rule, but did not get impatient that it should happen
in his lifetime.

	It seems to me that there are three main dangers.

	1. Napoleon

	2. A crisis arising from American political weakness.

	3. A technological surprise.

Morality

Can we overdo it?

yes, here's how

1. take the view that World War III has started.  This makes
permissible any action that would be permissible in war time.
Many such actions are immoral as long as we have some hope
of avoiding active war.  We have avoided war for 35 years, and
we can hope to avoid it indefinitely.

2. Escalation of action.  Attempting to assassinate Castro, if
it happened, was immoral.

3. Double-crossing allies.  If we support the Nicaraguan rebels
in order to prevent Nicaraguan aid to El Salvador rebels, we can't
simply abandon them if the Nicaraguans offer to stop helping
their friends in El Salvador.

De-escalation is better.  If they expel 5 diplomats wrongly,
retaliate by expelling 3.

Don't forget, however, that the peaceniks have their own sins
to atone for.  Cambodia, Operation Keelhaul, the Finns turning
back escapees from the Soviet Union.

The risk of nuclear war in the third world.

Is the motivation for opposing our side loss of political power?
morality of this.

Reagan plan for mutually assured defense.

If it ain't broke, don't fix it.

Maybe I can get LLW, Sidney Hook and Edward Teller to review it.

Almost every important person in public life has already taken
a position on the many defense issues.  They tend to look for
evidence supporting their previously taken positions.